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I. Introduction 
As Gideon v. Wainwright1 turns fifty, it shows its age. One 
cannot exactly call Gideon a failure, as it has spread defense 
counsel to nearly all felony cases, as well as many misdemeanor 
cases.2 But it has hardly been a ringing success. Caseloads keep 
                                                                                                     
  Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. Thanks to Ben Barton, Josh Bowers, Brandon Garrett, J.D. King, Robin 
Steinberg, and fellow participants in the Gideon at 50: Reassessing the Right to 
Counsel Symposium at the Washington and Lee University School of Law for 
their helpful discussion and comments. 
 1. 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
requires states to appoint defense counsel for indigent criminal defendants). But 
see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (establishing an actual-
imprisonment limitation on the right to counsel). 
 2. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1972) (extending 
Gideon to any offense that results in imprisonment). In one study, more than 
ninety-nine percent of state and federal inmates surveyed were represented by 
counsel on the offense for which they were imprisoned; two-thirds of federal 
inmates and more than four-fifths of state inmates had court-appointed counsel. 
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increasing far faster than budgets, spreading resources thinner 
and thinner. Underfunding and lack of support are chronic 
problems, stemming from political hostility or indifference to 
criminal defendants and the difficulty of guaranteeing funding 
sources, particularly ones that keep pace with steadily rising 
caseloads.3 
As a result, many defendants may have lawyers in name 
only, meeting with them for only five minutes—perhaps in a 
holding cell right before a court hearing—before being told to 
plead guilty at the initial appearance or soon thereafter. In the 
typical case, lawyers do little or no independent investigation to 
ferret out the truth or challenge the prosecution’s version of 
events. Indeed, the defense may not even await the prosecution’s 
discovery before immediately compromising on a guilty plea.4 
That is Potemkin lawyering, a costly charade far removed from 
Gideon’s vision.  
While in theory the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel 
be minimally effective,5 in practice it does not. To avoid 
overturning convictions in droves, the Supreme Court has 
watered down the definition of effective assistance of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment, so any “lawyer with a pulse will be 
deemed effective.”6 As too many cases chase too few lawyers with 
too little funding, the inevitable result is chronic ineffectiveness. 
The standard response of academics has been to lament this 
situation and to call for a new law or more aggressive litigation 
and constitutional challenges.7 Lawyers, they urge, are essential 
                                                                                                     
CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, NCJ 179023, at 1 (2000). 
 3. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECURING REASONABLE 
CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 12–19 (2011). 
 4. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-
Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 975–77 
(2012). 
 5. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (interpreting 
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to guarantee effective assistance of 
counsel, and setting forth a two-pronged test for reviewing counsel’s 
effectiveness). 
 6. Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999) 
(reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998)). 
 7. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL 
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guardians of rights and the rule of law. At the same time, 
academics continue to favor expanding Gideon’s ambit to 
guarantee lawyers in any number of civil cases implicating 
fundamental interests, such as housing, employment, or child 
custody.8 
The expansionist dream has proven to be an unattainable 
mirage. Gideon’s problems are deep, structural ones. We have 
been spreading resources too thin, in the process slighting the 
core cases such as capital and other serious felonies that are the 
most complex and need the most time and money. A perfunctory 
chat with a lawyer is little better than no lawyer at all. 
Moreover, the expansionist dream treats the problem simply 
as one of poverty. But, particularly in civil cases, the problem of 
lawyering is a deeper one of complexity and confusion. Even 
middle-class Americans have very little access to legal help, 
particularly ex ante, compared with citizens in many other 
countries.9 The American bar’s monopoly is a stranglehold, 
preventing paralegals and other paraprofessionals from offering 
low-cost assistance with routine legal issues and transactions.10 
And complicated substantive, procedural, and evidentiary rules 
                                                                                                     
JUSTICE (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE]; NAT’L RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009) 
[hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED]. 
 8. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
CIVIL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (2012), http://pabar.org/public/committees/lspublic/ 
Resolutions/ABA%20Civil%20Gideon%20Basic%20Principles%20Report%20wit
h%20Rec%205_21_10.pdf (advocating for the expansion of publicly funded 
counsel to include “low-income individuals . . . when basic human needs are at 
stake”); Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons From Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 530 (2006); Laura K. Abel, 
Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and Other Motivations Behind New 
Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2009); Russell 
Engler, Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines: When Does 
Access to Justice Mean Full Representation by Counsel, and When Might Less 
Assistance Suffice?, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 97, 97–98 (2010); Rachel Kleinman, 
Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1507, 1508–09 (2004); Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in 
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: The States’ Response to Lassiter, 14 
TOURO L. REV. 247, 275 (1997) (noting that courts and legislatures have become 
increasingly receptive to recognizing a right to counsel in child custody cases). 
 9. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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make it very difficult for citizens of ordinary intelligence to 
navigate the system on their own. Our system, in short, is 
overengineered, making the law too complex and legal services 
too expensive for the middle class, let alone the poor. 
Longer-term solutions need to move in the opposite direction. 
Rather than expanding Gideon’s ambitions and appetite to civil 
cases, we must shrink the universe of cases covered by Gideon to 
preserve its core. That would mean excluding nonjury 
misdemeanors and perhaps probationary sentences from its 
ambit, for example, and thinking harder up front about which 
cases need to be charged and pursued as felonies.  
Especially in bench trials, there are other ways to simplify 
cases to make lawyers less necessary. In particular, civil 
procedure could learn from inquisitorial systems, in which 
judicial officers are more active and the parties and their lawyers 
need do less. Magistrates could lead investigations, discovery, 
and witness examinations, relying less on the parties to 
proactively frame and pursue their claims. Inquisitorial 
procedure sounds like a strange transplant from civil-law 
countries. But it already has parallels in administrative systems 
for claiming government benefits, in which claimants commonly 
pursue their claims without lawyers.11 
There may also be ways to loosen the bar’s stranglehold so 
that paralegals, social workers, and others can automate delivery 
of legal services for routine cases. That change would resemble 
what we see in health care, as nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants are providing care in routine medical cases.12 
In short, Gideon can work in the real world only if lawyers 
drop their grandest ambitions for lawyerizing the world and 
instead step back to make lawyers less necessary in the first 
place. The goal should be to concentrate lawyers’ efforts on 
providing quality legal services in the highest-stakes cases where 
they are needed most. Quality and support matter more than 
quantity alone. 
Part II of this symposium Article identifies unavoidable 
resource constraints as Gideon’s Achilles’ heel. Part III critiques 
the wishful thinking of scholars and activists who hope to provide 
                                                                                                     
 11. See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra text accompanying note 71. 
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free legal services to all poor litigants in criminal and many civil 
cases. Not only is that dream politically and financially 
unattainable, but it also ignores the broader problem that legal 
services are too complex and expensive for middle-class 
Americans as well. The sustainable solution is not to expand an 
expensive entitlement, but to shrink the need, cost, and 
complexity of legal services in most cases.  
Part IV then begins to sketch out three clusters of more 
realistic reforms. First, Gideon should apply only to the core of 
felony cases tried by juries. Second, civil and minor criminal cases 
should be simplified to make it easier for parties to try them pro 
se, with the help of inquisitorial judges. And third, paralegals and 
others could give pro se litigants lower-cost assistance if we 
relaxed the bar’s monopoly on legal services. Such reforms, I 
conclude, would not only be simpler, cheaper, and more politically 
palatable, but also make the law more transparent and 
intelligible. 
II. Resource Constraints 
There is not nearly enough money to appoint and support 
counsel for all indigent litigants. Others at this symposium have 
already covered these resource constraints in depth, so I will be 
brief. Appointed defense counsel are underpaid, undersupported, 
and overworked. They are often paid flat fees or low hourly rates 
subject to low caps. At a rate of, say, $50 per hour subject to a 
$1,000 cap, appointed counsel receives no compensation for 
investing more than twenty hours in taking a case to trial.13 
These rates are often below market rates and not adjusted for 
inflation. They hardly suffice to cover a law firm’s basic overhead, 
including rent and secretaries, let alone compensate counsel at 
anything near market rates. Funding for experts, paralegals, and 
investigators is scant. Caseloads are staggering and increasing 
                                                                                                     
 13. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1997) (“[A] typical 
appointed defense lawyer faces something like the following pay scale: $30 or 
$40 an hour for the first twenty to thirty hours, and zero thereafter.”). 
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far faster than the numbers of lawyers or the funding available 
for them.14  
The low pay and poor working conditions discourage talented 
lawyers from taking on this work. Some will take it to accumulate 
marketable trial experience, but they will likely leave after a few 
years to cash in on that experience. Ideological or other 
commitments may keep other talented lawyers in the pool, but 
those who remain are likely to have fewer other options. 
The only way that appointed lawyers can tread water or 
break even is to plead out most of their cases very quickly, 
earning a series of small fees. In the ordinary case, that means 
doing little or no investigation beyond reading the police report 
and charging instrument and possibly asking the prosecutor and 
the client for their versions of the facts.15 Particularly when 
clients are incarcerated and difficult to visit, lawyers may have 
little time to meet with them until they are brought to court. 
Lawyers may thus meet their clients at arraignment and 
immediately urge them to plead guilty, a common strategy known 
as “meet ‘em and plead ‘em.”16 
The problem is especially acute when the playing field is 
tilted in favor of the state. Criminal defense lawyers often face off 
against better-paid assistant district attorneys, who enjoy the 
support of police investigators and state forensic crime labs.17 
Greater pay and economies of scale allow assistant district 
attorneys to mature, gain experience, and specialize in subfields 
such as capital punishment, which exacerbate the inequality. 
Thus, defense lawyers are frequently outgunned. 
Funding and resources are even more sparse in civil cases. 
Legal aid funding is far too scant to keep up with the many 
pressing civil cases, ranging from evictions of tenants to 
deportations of immigrants to terminations of parental rights. 
And while the bar provides pro bono services, they are not nearly 
                                                                                                     
 14. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 3, at 12–19 (canvassing scholarly studies that 
highlight the problems of high and rising caseloads for appointed defense 
counsel). 
 15. See Barton & Bibas, supra note 4, at 975–77. 
 16. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 7, at 16; Paul Marcus & 
Mary Sue Backus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A National Crisis, 
57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1081–84 (2006).  
 17. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
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enough. Thus, the Legal Services Corporation has estimated that 
existing legal services are meeting less than one-fifth of poor 
people’s legal needs.18 The result is severe rationing, meaning 
that claimants receive only brief advice, must wait on long 
waiting lists, or receive no help at all.19 
Indigent defense is not politically popular, so voters and 
politicians are loath to raise taxes to support it. Rather, funds 
often come from ad hoc sources, such as traffic tickets (for 
criminal defense) or the interest on lawyers’ trust accounts 
(IOLTA, for civil legal aid).20 These sources are not tied to rising 
caseloads, expenses, or inflation, so they fail to keep pace and 
often run out. Particularly because caseloads keep rising, 
indigent defense funding often proves insufficient. 
III. Wishful Thinking and Failed Reforms 
The standard academic response to this sorry state of affairs 
is to say that there ought to be a law. More specifically, scholars 
and bar associations call for more lawyers, more funding, more 
paralegals, more investigators, more experts—more of 
everything. For nearly half a century, activists have pushed to 
extend Gideon further, both to minor criminal cases and to civil 
cases.21 And as the promise of effective assistance gave way to the 
reality of underfunding, activists have pursued both legislation 
and litigation, raising constitutional challenges to the lack of 
resources.22 Leaders of the bar have likewise called on lawyers to 
contribute more of their time to pro bono work. 
                                                                                                     
 18. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 3 
(2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap 
_in_america_2009.pdf. 
 19. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 13–14 (2004). 
 20. See Rodger Citron, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural 
Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 481, 498 
(1991); Hugh M. Collins, Major Improvements to the Law: Indigent Defense, 
Juvenile Justice Reforms and More, 56 L.A. B.J. 268, 271 (2008) (discussing 
Louisiana’s IOLTA program). 
 21. See Louis S. Rulli, On The Road to Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the 
Enactment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil 
Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J. L. & POL’Y 683, 685–86 (2011). 
 22. See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A 
Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. 
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These laments and jeremiads have failed to effect meaningful 
reform. Most such challenges have failed, as courts view the 
separation of powers as barring interference in legislative 
funding decisions.23 Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected 
efforts to extend the Sixth Amendment right to criminal defense 
counsel into the civil arena.24 Occasionally a court will declare 
indigent defense funding inadequate and order more funds or 
even halt prosecutions for a time, spurring lawmakers to react.25 
But such funding increases are usually one-shot responses that 
fail to keep pace with inflation and caseloads. Any gains are 
temporary and soon erode. 
The root causes of the problem resist easy treatment. First, of 
course, it is politically unpopular to spend money on providing 
free lawyers, particularly to criminal defendants.26 That political 
dynamic is difficult if not impossible to fix. Second, the price of 
                                                                                                     
LEGIS. 487, 489 (2010) (“Congress can and should pass legislation reinforcing 
the constitutional right to counsel in order to break the stalemate that has 
plagued indigent defense reform.”); see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 7, at 
103, 147 (discussing the use of litigation and legislation); Recent Legislation: 
Access to Justice—Civil Right to Counsel—California Establishes Pilot Programs 
to Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties—Act of Oct. 11, 2009, ch. 
457 (codified in scattered sections of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code and Cal. Gov’t Code), 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1532–39 (2010) (discussing legislation providing for a 
civil right to counsel in California and other jurisdictions in certain prescribed 
circumstances). 
 23. See, e.g., In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 
1130, 1136 (Fla. 1990) (“[I]t is not the function of this Court to decide what 
constitutes adequate funding [for public defenders] and then order the 
legislature to appropriate such an amount. Appropriation of funds for the 
operation of government is a legislative function.”); In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 
56 (N.Y. 1975) (“The appropriation and provision of authority for the 
expenditure of public funds [for appointment of counsel] is a legislative and not 
a judicial function, both in the Nation and in the State.”); In re Enrique R., 126 
A.D.2d 169, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (“[The authority of the court] does not 
extend to direct that such legal services be provided out of public funds in the 
absence of statutory authorization for such expenditure.”). 
 24. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (holding that “the 
Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at 
civil contempt proceedings to an indigent defendant who is subject to a child 
support order, even if that individual faces incarceration . . . .”); Lassiter v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981) (indicating that the right to counsel 
applies only when the defendant may lose his “physical liberty”). 
 25. See, e.g., State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 327 (La. 2005); State v. Peart, 
621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1164 (Okla. 1990). 
 26. See Citron, supra note 20, at 498. 
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legal professionals is too high because the supply of those who 
can afford to do low-paying work is low. Becoming a lawyer 
requires three years of law school plus cramming for and passing 
a bar exam. Law school tuitions are horrifically expensive, 
leaving graduates deep in debt and in need of high earnings to 
repay their loans.27  
Moreover, the organized bar holds a monopoly on providing 
legal services. Statutes forbid unauthorized practice of law by 
those who have not been licensed as lawyers.28 Courts interpret 
those bans expansively, to reach many services that in other 
countries are provided by paralegals, notaries, and similar 
paraprofessionals, such as routine wills, divorces, and child-
custody disputes.29 The bar’s cartel keeps prices high. 
Those prices pose difficulties not only for poor litigants, but 
also for the vast majority of middle-class people. In America, 
corporations hire the bulk of lawyers’ time. Middle-class 
individuals consume a much smaller share of legal services than 
their compatriots in other countries—only a few hours per person 
per year.30 That scarcity affects not only litigation of problems ex 
post, but also seeking advice ex ante when considering a possible 
contract, property division, or custody arrangement.31 Thus, as 
Gillian Hadfield has argued, scholars’ exclusive focus on indigent 
representation has obscured the broader problem: laws are too 
                                                                                                     
 27. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 107–12 (2012). 
 28. See Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2581, 2581–87 (1999). 
 29. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Burdzinski, Brinkman, Czarzasty & 
Landwehr, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 372, 375 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the licensing and 
regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the states, and that states 
have broad powers to regulate professions); see also Indiana ex rel. Ind. State 
Bar Ass’n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 443 (Ind. 2005) (discussing the unauthorized 
practice of law in Indiana by a notary). But see Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
CompManagement, Inc., 857 N.E.2d 95, 126 (Ohio 2006) (establishing the right 
of nonlawyer respondent to provide services in workers’ compensation cases). 
 30. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative 
Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 139–46 (2009) (offering empirical evidence that middle-
class Americans do not receive the same amount of legal services as do those in 
other countries). 
 31. See id. at 146 (noting that the average household receives “less than an 
hour’s worth of legal advice or assistance in dealing with the points at which 
their everyday lives intersect with the legal system”). 
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complex and legal services are too expensive for ordinary people 
to plan their lives and respond to crises.32 That reality stands in 
sharp contrast to our self-image as a nation that lives by the 
rule of law. And there is no solving this much larger problem 
through a huge new middle-class legal entitlement, particularly 
given the country’s current financial straits. Neither litigation 
nor largesse is promising as a way forward. 
IV. Realistic Reforms 
A more sustainable approach is to restructure the nature of 
and market for legal services to make them less necessary and 
less expensive in the first place. First, courts could shrink 
Gideon to its core of felony cases involving prison sentences to 
concentrate resources there instead of spreading them too thin.33 
Second, courts and legislatures could simplify procedures, 
adding more inquisitorial aspects to pretrial and trial 
procedures to make lawyers less necessary.34 And third, 
legislatures could relax the organized bar’s monopoly, allowing 
paraprofessionals and self-help assistance to reduce the need for 
lawyers.35 A grand bargain to save Gideon, in short, would mean 
shrinking its broad ambitions in order to concentrate and 
preserve its core values. 
A. Putting Gideon on a Sustainable Diet 
The right to appointed counsel originated in capital cases, 
in Powell v. Alabama.36 Gideon extended Powell to felonies; 
Argersinger v. Hamlin37 then extended Gideon to misdemeanors, 
at least those resulting in “actual imprisonment”; and Alabama 
                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 131–33. 
 33. See infra Part IV.A. 
 34. See infra Part IV.B. 
 35. See infra Part IV.C. 
 36. 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
 37. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
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v. Shelton,38 in turn, extended Argersinger to suspended 
sentences.39 That triple extension is at least one too many. 
While courts can announce Sixth Amendment rights in 
ringing tones, they can hardly make those rights meaningful. 
Scholars have largely ignored the inevitable resource constraints 
and tradeoffs. In advocating for more counsel here, there, and 
everywhere, they have failed to confront the problem of scarcity, 
to see that appointing lawyers here, there, and everywhere will 
inevitably spread resources too thin, leaving lawyers too harried 
to be effective.40 
In a world of scarcity, the government must do triage. And in 
that triage, the many simple cases should drop out of the system 
to save time and money for the smaller number of complex ones. 
Evidence at least suggests that appointing lawyers does not make 
a discernible difference in misdemeanor cases.41 Careful empirical 
scholars, in a randomized, controlled study, have found no 
evidence that appointing lawyers makes a difference in simple 
civil cases such as unemployment appeals.42 If lawyers do matter 
somewhat in these cases, the effects must be too subtle to be 
easily detectable. 
What those cases have in common is that they are jury-free. 
In simple, nonjury proceedings, parties can often articulate their 
assets, employment, and needs themselves, or judges can help 
them to do so on their own.43 Lawyers may be helpful, but they 
                                                                                                     
 38. 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).  
 39. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 341–45 (1963); Argersinger, 407 
U.S. at 37–38; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (limiting the 
extension of Gideon to misdemeanors that could result in actual imprisonment); 
Shelton, 535 U.S. at 658. 
 40. See Barton & Bibas, supra note 4, at 990–91 (discussing the problems 
created by the paucity of resources for indigent defense counsel). 
 41. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 490–93 tbls.2, 3, 4, 5 & 6, 496 (2007). Even in felony 
cases, there is some evidence that pro se defendants fare at least as well as 
represented ones. See Indiana v. Edwards, 544 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (citing 
study). This evidence, however, may be complicated by the selection effects due 
to the types of persons who choose to represent themselves. 
 42. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized 
Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and 
Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2143–44, 2149–53 (2012). 
 43. See id. at 2174–75 (offering these as two of three plausible explanations 
for the study’s empirical findings that lawyers made no difference, but 
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are not essential across the board to prevent fundamental 
unfairness.44 Jury trials, by contrast, typically involve more 
complex rules of procedure and evidence, including motions in 
limine, jury selection, sidebar conferences, and stricter 
application of the rules of evidence. And jury trials correlate with 
the most serious cases: crimes for which a defendant may serve 
more than six months’ imprisonment.45 
By contrast, the same researchers who studied 
unemployment appeals have found that lawyers do improve their 
clients’ outcomes in summary eviction proceedings.46 That may be 
because the legal-aid provider selected cases that could benefit 
from representation, the governing laws are complex, the facts 
require investigation, the proceedings are aggressively 
adversarial with little judicial involvement, and the other side is 
almost always represented by counsel.47 Thus, there is far more 
for lawyers to do in those cases and far less judicial involvement 
to level the playing field. 
In doing triage, battlefield doctors focus on the cases where 
they can make a difference, leaving aside those whose mild 
injuries do not urgently call for professional help. The same logic 
applies here. Where a defendant faces charges that can result in 
a felony record and serious prison time, he needs a lawyer to 
negotiate a plea bargain and credibly threaten to go to a jury 
trial. Where the stakes are lower and the procedures are simpler, 
we must find simpler, cheaper alternatives to giving everyone a 
lawyer. One could envision a grand bargain, in which legal 
services were deeper but more focused, with a narrower but more 
rigorously policed mandate. That approach could concentrate 
funding and manpower on felony and the most serious 
                                                                                                     
cautioning that the third possible explanation was a selection effect). 
 44. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (finding that the 
critical question in child-support cases, the defendant’s ability to pay, can be so 
“sufficiently straightforward” that pro se litigants can adequately address it, 
given adequate procedures). 
 45. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[W]e have concluded 
that no offense can be deemed petty for purposes of the right to trial by jury 
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”). 
 46. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A 
Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the 
Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 926–31 (2013).  
 47. See id. at 924, 937–45. 
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misdemeanor cases, while offering the alternatives below for 
other cases. And it would counteract the temptation to lower 
ineffective-assistance standards to accommodate the realities of 
mass indigent defense. 
There certainly is room to debate where to draw the line. One 
could extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only as far as 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury, which covers all felonies 
and the most serious misdemeanors. Jury trials necessitate jury 
instructions, sidebar conferences, other formal motions, and 
stricter enforcement of the rules of evidence, making lawyers 
especially important. Or one could limit the right to all felonies, 
given the stigma and consequences associated with a criminal 
record. But some misdemeanors carry grave, nearly automatic 
collateral consequences such as deportation, sex-offender 
confinement or registration, or loss of a job or child custody. 
Functionally, it is fairer to view these automatic consequences as 
part of the effective punishment and to provide defense lawyers 
accordingly, given the high stakes. At a minimum, then, the 
automatic right to appointed counsel should not apply to 
misdemeanors tried without juries that do not carry those most 
serious collateral consequences. But that reform ought to go hand 
in hand with the procedural simplification and alternatives to 
lawyers discussed below. 
There are alternatives to an automatic, across-the-board 
right to counsel. Courts, for example, could apply their inherent 
authority to appoint counsel in cases with particular needs for 
lawyers. That should not be an ad hoc inquiry: Gideon overruled 
the special-circumstances test of Betts v. Brady48 because it was 
unworkable.49 But court appointment could turn on various 
categories of defendants who especially need counsel, such as 
those who are juveniles, mentally ill, mentally retarded, or 
unable to speak English. Or legal aid societies could have a pot of 
funding sufficient to represent a fraction of all misdemeanor 
defendants and do triage themselves based on each case’s merit, 
                                                                                                     
 48. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 225 
(1963).  
 49. Compare Betts, 316 U.S. at 462–64 (rejecting a categorical right to 
appointed counsel “whatever the circumstances”), with Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343–
45 (overruling Betts and recognizing a categorical Sixth Amendment right to 
appointed counsel). 
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complexity, stakes, and need for counsel to make a difference.50 
Indeed, that is what legal aid offices already do in civil cases.51 
That would concentrate funds on the most needy and meritorious 
cases in the pool, instead of spreading them too thin. 
It is also worth thinking about the dynamic effects of moving 
the right-to-counsel line. Giving prosecutors leeway to pursue 
minor convictions informally, in exchange for not seeking felony 
convictions or serious collateral consequences, would encourage 
lesser dispositions. Of course, there is always the risk that 
prosecutors will threaten heavier sentences to induce defendants 
to waive their trial and counsel rights. But the incentive to stack 
charges already exists, and initially filing the heavier charge 
would trigger appointment of defense counsel and hence 
adversarial pushback. My hope is that prosecutors might more 
carefully screen their minor-case dockets, evaluating which 
defendants most need felony records and major collateral 
consequences even at the price of longer, more formal, adversarial 
proceedings. 
B. Facilitating Pro Se Litigation 
A meaningful alternative to providing lawyers would be to 
simplify smaller cases, which would make it easier for pro se 
litigants to navigate them on their own. Some steps are obvious. 
Courts need to do a far better job of translating their forms and 
instructions into plain English and posting them on court 
websites. They could easily streamline rules of evidence and 
procedure, obviating the cumbersome hoops through which law 
students learn to jump. Why, for example, must litigants mark, 
                                                                                                     
 50. Indeed, several prominent supporters of a civil right to counsel, 
including a past president of the American Bar Association, have embraced 
letting service providers do triage on the merits as an alternative to across-the-
board rights to counsel. See John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, Response, It’s Not 
Triage if the Patient Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 40, 51–52 
(2012), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2012/Pollock 
Greco.pdf. 
 51. True, the funding levels for Legal Services Corporation may well be too 
low, and the fraction of cases they can cover may be too small. But that is hardly 
a reason to go to the other extreme and to try to expand the fraction to 100%. 
Rather, it supports trying to strike a balance somewhere in the middle. 
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identify, authenticate, and only then offer exhibits into evidence? 
Why apply the hearsay rules in all their abstruseness, 
particularly to civil cases not covered by the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause, when so many other countries do not? 
Many of these rules of procedure and evidence were developed at 
least in part as mechanisms to allow judges to control juries. That 
reason ceases to apply in bench trials, so the rules could be 
curtailed there as well. 
A more ambitious reform would be to recast minor cases from 
an adversarial to an inquisitorial model.52 To oversimplify, the 
classic adversarial model depends on the parties’ lawyers to 
proactively frame the issues, investigate, conduct discovery, 
interview and present witnesses, and the like. The classic 
inquisitorial model, historically associated with civil-law 
countries, empowers a judicial officer, an investigating 
magistrate, to proactively frame the issues, investigate a case, 
and question witnesses.53 The parties can thus be much more 
passive, suggesting leads and lines of inquiry but not themselves 
recruiting and questioning the witnesses.54 Because a neutral 
judge proactively does much more of the work, a lawyer is far less 
necessary. Likewise, law enforcement officers could be called 
upon to document their work far more carefully and neutrally, to 
minimize the need for the parties to investigate and challenge 
                                                                                                     
 52. While the Sixth Amendment requires adversarial procedures such as 
jury trials and partisan defense counsel in major criminal cases, the Court has 
not demanded the same procedures in trials of petty offenses. See, e.g., Scott v. 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (limiting the Sixth Amendment right to 
appointed counsel to criminal cases that result in “actual imprisonment”); 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158–62 (1968) (extending the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial to the states but recognizing an exception for 
petty offenses).  
 53. See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1634, 1635–37 (2009). These ideal types have been blurred in practice, as 
countries on each side of the divide have borrowed from the other. Thus, it is no 
longer strictly accurate to equate civil-law countries with inquisitorial systems, 
although many still fall toward that end of what is now a spectrum. See id. at 
1639–40. 
 54. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN O. HALEY, THE 
CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1033–34 (1994) 
(describing the role of the German judge in civil procedure); John H. Langbein, 
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985) 
(discussing the differences in the roles of judges and lawyers in the German and 
American legal systems). 
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live witnesses. Less adversarial investigations might even build 
better and more accurate records, free of the distorting effects of 
partisan witness interviews and the perverse incentives to avoid 
generating documents that could be used for cross-examination.55 
Inquisitorialism may sound like an exotic, foreign import, but 
it already has taken root in a number of civil contexts, such as 
unemployment-compensation appeals and Social Security 
disability claims. “Virtually all mass justice systems have decided 
that they are unable to function effectively without the active-
adjudicator investigation, informal rules of evidence and 
procedure, and presiding officer control of issue definition and 
development that characterize an inquisitorial or examinational 
approach.”56 Procedures are often informal and nonadversarial, 
claimants for government benefits are typically unrepresented, 
and administrative law judges (ALJs) must help claimants 
develop the facts as well as adjudicate based on the evidence 
presented.57  
In a Social Security disability case, for example, the ALJ 
“acts as an examiner charged with developing the facts.”58 ALJs 
must take active roles in developing documentary and testimonial 
evidence before and at hearings.59 Hearing officer staffers must 
determine the issues, determine what additional documentary 
evidence is needed, and prepare exhibits, interpreters, and expert 
and lay witnesses as necessary. That may involve seeking 
evidence directly from treating physicians or other sources, by 
subpoena if necessary, or hiring medical or vocational experts. 
The ALJ will admit relevant exhibits without being bound by the 
rules of evidence, and may question witnesses or allow them to 
                                                                                                     
 55. I am grateful to Brandon Garrett for this insightful point. 
 56. Jerry L. Mashaw, Unemployment Compensation: Continuity, Change, 
and the Prospects for Reform, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 16 (1995–1996) (noting 
that mass administrative courts also “promote speed and professionalism in 
claims administration”). 
 57. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Management Side of Due Process: Some 
Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and 
Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 
772, 780–83 (1974) (highlighting the salient features of administrative-law 
proceedings that differ from adversarial proceedings). 
 58. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). 
 59. See id. (noting the active role of the ALJ in the investigative and fact-
finding processes). 
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narrate their testimony.60 Likewise, in unemployment 
compensation appeals in Massachusetts, ALJs collect relevant 
documents and question witnesses.61  
Another American analogue is the small-claims court, where 
lawyers are not only unnecessary but in many places forbidden, 
in order to keep procedures simple and level the playing field for 
pro se litigants on both sides.62 Excluding lawyers keeps 
proceedings streamlined and simple, while admitting them 
breeds formality and complexity and tilts the playing field 
against pro se litigants.63 Small-claims courts often dispense with 
formal rules of procedure and evidence, making it far easier for 
parties to represent themselves. Judges may act as active 
inquisitors, directing questioning and assisting the parties in 
gathering and admitting evidence.64 In Iowa, for instance, the 
small-claims judge “swears in the parties and their witnesses and 
examines them.”65  
Of course, European inquisitorial systems depend in part on 
careful selection and training of judges as part of a careerist civil 
service. That model is not easy to transplant into elected 
                                                                                                     
 60. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, 
HALLEX: HEARINGS, APPEALS AND LITIGATION LAW MANUAL I-2-1-5, I-2-5-14 to 
-78, I-2-6-56 to -74 (2009) http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/hallex/ 
hallex.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 61. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 42, at 2174. 
 62. See generally Bruce J. Graham & John R. Snortum, Small Claims 
Court, 60 JUDICATURE 260 (1977); Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute 
Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339 (1976); 
Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 6 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 293 (1981). 
 63. See STEVEN WELLER & JOHN C. RUHNKA, PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON 
THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT 20–21 (1979); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 
2507, 2519 (2011) (making the same point about family court); Barton & Bibas, 
supra note 4, at 983–84 (same). 
 64. See WELLER & RUHNKA, supra note 63, at 20–21 (noting that small-
claims courts proceed informally because the “ideal of self-representation in 
small claims court can be met only if the rules of a formal civil trial are 
relaxed”). Thus, experts recommend that judges in small-claims court direct the 
questioning, grant continuances to permit further evidence-gathering, leave 
court to view outside evidence, and receive evidence telephonically from certain 
missing witnesses, and that lawyers not be permitted to question witnesses or 
raise objections. Id. at 21–25.  
 65. Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims 
Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433, 463 (1996). 
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American judiciaries run by adversarial lawyers. But states could 
still pursue it, much as they have professionalized many 
administrative agencies, creating civil services and training 
programs. The adversarial mindset may be difficult to change, 
but it is not impossible. One key change would be to ban or 
severely restrict lawyers in these disputes and perhaps substitute 
paraprofessionals, as the next section suggests. 
C. Loosening Lawyers’ Monopoly: Permitting Paraprofessional 
Practice 
The American organized bar is exceptional in the degree to 
which it operates as a cartel, restricting the provision of even 
routine legal services by nonlawyers. Most other countries allow 
paraprofessionals, ranging from notaries to paralegals to court 
clerks, to provide a range of services. In five central European 
countries, for example, notaries handle real estate transactions 
and registries, security interests, corporate transactions from 
formation through liquidation, marital property contracts and 
arrangements, same-sex civil unions, uncontested divorces, 
probate and intestacy proceedings, consumer financial services, 
and alternative dispute resolution. In some cases, consumers may 
choose whether to hire a lawyer or a notary for the same type of 
transaction.66 In Germany, notaries handle real estate 
conveyances, mortgages, incorporations, wills, estate and tax 
planning, powers of attorney, and important contracts.67 Japan 
has many kinds of legal professionals besides lawyers authorized 
to litigate in court, including patent attorneys, administrative 
law specialists, judicial scriveners, tax attorneys, social insurance 
and labor specialists, and in-house transactional lawyers. Not all 
of these professionals need to hold the equivalent of J.D.s.68 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Ninel Jasmine, Notaries in Europe: A Comparison Based on 
Selected Countries, in 26 NOTARIES IN EUROPE—GROWING FIELDS OF 
COMPETENCE 33–45 (2007).  
 67. See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, THE CIVIL LAW NOTARY—
NEUTRAL LAWYER FOR THE SITUATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON PREVENTATIVE 
JUSTICE IN MODERN SOCIETIES 29–30 (2010) (discussing the multifaceted 
functions that notaries perform in Germany, many of which fall within the 
exclusive prerogative of lawyers in the United States). 
 68. See Kenneth L. Port, The Spirit of Japanese Law, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
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In handling transactions, civil-law notaries serve not as 
partisan representatives of one side. Rather, they are neutral, 
impartial, independent professionals who effectuate transactions 
in keeping with all the parties’ intents and understandings.69 The 
use of a single nonlawyer professional, whose fee may be 
proportioned to the value of the transaction, holds down costs and 
levels the playing field for poor, ignorant consumers. By contrast, 
the American expectation that each side hire its own lawyer 
favors rich, repeat players such as financial institutions with in-
house counsel.70 Thus, the American bar’s monopoly makes it 
harder and more expensive for poor and middle-class Americans 
to get help ex ante in structuring and understanding 
transactions. As a result, poor and middle-class Americans often 
go unrepresented and neglect advance planning, leading to larger 
messes when crises do erupt. 
In medicine, where lives are at stake, we let nurse 
practitioners, midwives, paramedics, and urgent care clinics 
provide certain routine services but refer more complex matters 
to doctors. Indeed, many women who could afford obstetricians 
choose to hire midwives instead. They trust these 
paraprofessional specialists to triage and refer the fraction of 
complicated births to hospitals while conducting routine 
deliveries themselves more simply, cheaply, and informally.71 So 
too the law could let paralegals, social workers, and court clerks 
assist and advise litigants in routine criminal and civil cases, as 
well as those contemplating routine wills, divorces, contracts, 
corporations, and the like. Help lines and chat rooms could 
automate the delivery of these services. Websites like 
legalzoom.com and rocketlawyer.com, which already draft routine 
wills, leases, loans, contracts, articles of incorporation, and the 
                                                                                                     
STUD. L. REV. 573, 577–78 (2002) (reviewing JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF 
JAPANESE LAW (1998)) (implying that only those who litigate before a court and 
in-house transactional attorneys need to hold the equivalent of J.D.s). 
 69. See MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 67, at 30 (“When a notary is called 
upon to authenticate a transaction, the notary is not representing a client . . . in 
the way a lawyer would. . . . The notary’s duty is not directed toward any 
particular participant, it rather extends to all of them.”). 
 70. See id. at 209 (noting the inherent income bias in the American system 
in favor of the rich). 
 71. I am grateful to Robin Steinberg for this point. 
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like, could do more. Do-it-yourself seminars, webinars, and 
manuals could provide simple forms and clear explanations, 
allowing average litigants to pursue cookie-cutter claims such as 
simple divorces.  
Just as medical services are trying to emphasize preventive 
care to head off expensive emergency-room visits down the road, 
a broader approach to legal services could emphasize proactive 
planning of marital, child custody, immigration, employment, 
estate, and potentially even criminal matters. Indeed, several 
public defenders’ offices, such as Neighborhood Defender Services 
of Harlem and the Bronx Defenders, already seek to take a more 
proactive, preventive approach, emphasizing investigation and 
early resolution of cases.72 Neighborhood Defender Services uses 
a team approach, delegating tasks to nonlawyers, such as having 
investigators handle some communication with clients.73 That 
flexibility makes it easier and cheaper to represent those of 
modest means. 
In America, too often we act as if providing more lawyers is 
an end in itself. It is not; it is simply a means of ensuring better 
informed and fairer outcomes. Bringing down the price of legal 
help from a luxury good to a commodity can only promote 
planning, advice, and dispute resolution. That requires increasing 
the supply and lowering the cost of supply, by allowing more 
nonlawyer professionals to enter the field without first spending 
three years and six figures to acquire a full-fledged J.D. Specialist 
professionals need not acquire that breadth of knowledge if they 
do not plan to be jacks of all trades. Perhaps law schools and 
colleges could develop shorter paraprofessional training, akin to 
paralegal courses, to prepare people to handle unemployment 
compensation, disability claims, uncontested divorces, estate 
planning, and similar specialized tracks. Night programs, 
distance learning, accelerated courses, and other innovations 
beyond traditional legal education (which ABA accreditation 
rules currently forbid) could further push down the cost and thus 
increase the supply of paraprofessional specialists.74 It makes no 
                                                                                                     
 72. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Public 
Defenders in the Neighborhood: A Harlem Law Office Stresses Teamwork, Early 
Investigation (Mar. 2007), https://www/ncirs/gov/pdffiles/163061.pdf. 
 73. See id. at 2. 
 74. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE 
SHRINKING GIDEON 1307 
sense to require that legal representation always meet a Cadillac-
level standard that few can afford or receive for free. It would be 
far better to offer serviceable scooters to everyone for run-of-the-
mill cases, reserving the few appointed lawyers for those cases of 
unusual complexity. 
V. Conclusion 
American justice is tied in a Gordian knot. In elaborating 
Gideon, the Supreme Court has extended the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel far beyond the core of felony jury trials to the 
much larger universe of misdemeanors even without jury trials or 
immediate imprisonment. But that abstract right collides with 
the political economy of indigent defense. The Court can 
announce such a broad right, but it can hardly ensure that the 
political branches will fund it. Thus, Gideon and its progeny rest 
on no stable foundation. Legislatures chronically underfund 
indigent defense and legal aid, relying on a hodgepodge of income 
streams such as court costs and traffic tickets that do not keep 
pace with rising caseloads. Courts are loath to order more 
funding, recognizing the limits of the judicial role under the 
separation of powers. And rather than embracing procedural 
reforms, bar associations argue only for more lawyers. At best, 
they exhort their members to offer pro bono assistance to plug the 
yawning void. This state of affairs is even harder to repair in the 
current economic climate, as lawyers’ incomes and employment 
have stagnated or sagged, making meaningful reform even more 
contentious. 
The state of affairs is so bad that it may indeed be a good 
time for reform. Pro se caseloads continue to climb, and judges 
lack enough lawyers to appoint to these cases and funds with 
which to compensate them. Moreover, in rejecting a new civil-
Gideon right, the Supreme Court in Turner v. Rogers75 
simultaneously prodded states to pursue pro se court reform as a 
cheaper and sometimes fairer alternative.76 Though legislatures 
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 75. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 76. Id. at 2519–20. 
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and bar authorities may not pursue reform from the top down, 
changes are bubbling from the bottom up, as websites and 
publishers offer assistance to litigants who otherwise would have 
none. There may be no one sword to slice the Gordian knot, but 
perhaps a number of mice to nibble away at its strands.77 The 
question is whether courts and legislatures will try in vain to 
squelch these reforms, at the behest of the organized bar, or 
instead bow to and embrace the reality of the situation. We may 
be able to appoint fewer lawyers, giving each one the time and 
resources he needs to mount a serious felony defense, yet have 
more justice in the realms where lawyers are less necessary. 
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